Descargar Tails 4.25

Mientras se descarga, te recomendados que leas las notas de lanzamiento para Tails 4.25 .  Estas detallan todos los cambios en esta nueva versión: nuevas funcionalidades, problemas solucionados, y errores conocidos que ya han sido identificados.

1.2Verifica tu descarga

Para tu seguridad, verifica siempre tu descarga.


Con una descarga no verificada, podrías:

  • Perder tiempo si tu archivo está incompleto o roto por errores durante la descarga. Esto es bastante frecuente.
  • Get hacked while using Tails if one of our download mirrors has been compromised and is serving malicious downloads. This already happened to other operating systems.

¿Cómo funciona la verificación?

Tu cliente BitTorrent verificará automáticamente la descarga cuando haya terminado.

La verificación debajo es opcional para una descarga por BitTorrent.

Se ha instalado la extensión Tails Verification

Desde Diciembre del 2020, puedes hacer la verificación directamente desde la página. Ya no necesitas la extensión Tails Verification y puedes eliminarla.

Lee nuestra declaración sobre la deprecación de la extensión Tails Verification.

Parece que tienes JavaScript deshabilitado. Para verificar tu descarga, puedes:

Parece que estás usando Internet Explorer. Para verificar tu descarga, por favor utiliza otro navegador.

or download the OpenPGP signature


OpenPGP signing key

OpenPGP signature OpenPGP signature

We removed our instructions to verify downloads with OpenPGP.

Without advanced knowledge of OpenPGP, verifying with OpenPGP provides the same level of security as the JavaScript verification on the page, while being much more complicated and error-prone.

Both the JavaScript and the OpenPGP verification rely on the HTTPS encryption of our website to provide either a correct OpenPGP signature or a correct JavaScript verification. That is why both verification techniques can protect you from a malicious download from one of our mirrors but cannot protect you if our website gets compromised.

The only way to completely protect you in case our website gets compromised would be for you to build a strong trust path to our OpenPGP signing key using the OpenPGP Web of Trust.

Our installation instructions from Debian, Ubuntu, or Mint using the command line and GnuPG still explain how to use the OpenPGP Web of Trust. Our team thinks that it is not worth helping you do so from other operating systems. You would have to learn these advanced OpenPGP skills elsewhere.

Verificando $FILENAME

¡Verificación exitosa! ($FILENAME)

¡Ha fallado la verificación! ($FILENAME)


Lo más probable es que la verificación falle debido a un error o interrupción durante la descarga.

La verificación también falla si intentas verificar una descarga distinta a la última versión de Tails: 4.25 .

También podría ser, aunque es menos probable, que la verificación haya fallado a causa de una descarga malintencionada de alguno de nuestros mirrors, o a causa de un ataque en tu red local o país.

Una nueva descarga es normalmente suficiente para solucionar este problema. También puedes intentar descargar con otro ordenador.

¿Cómo funciona la verificación?

Por favor, intenta la descarga nuevamente…

Por favor, intenta la descarga nuevamente…

Error seleccionando imagen.

Asegúrate de que eliges una imagen USB que tu navegador pueda leer.

Asegúrate de que eliges una imagen ISO que tu navegador pueda leer.


Error al descargar el archivo de verificación de nuestro sitio web.

Asegúrate de que tu navegador está conectado a Internet.


Error al leer la imagen $FILENAME.

Asegúrate de que $FILENAME puede ser leído por tu navegador.


1.3Continúa instalando actualizando instalando o actualizando

Warnings: Tails is safe but not magic!

Tails is safer than any regular operating system. But Tails, or any software or operating system, cannot protect you from everything—even if they pretend to.

The recommendations below will keep you even safer, especially if you are at high risk.

Protecting your identity when using Tails

Tails is designed to hide your identity.

But some of your activities could reveal your identity:

  • Sharing files with metadata, such as date, time, location, and device information
  • Using Tails for more than one purpose at a time

Limitations of the Tor network

Tails uses the Tor network because it is the strongest and most popular network to protect from surveillance and censorship.

But Tor has limitations if you are concerned about:

  • Hiding that you are using Tor and Tails
  • Protecting your online communications from determined, skilled attackers

Reducing risks when using untrusted computers

Tails can safely run on a computer that has a virus.

But Tails cannot always protect you when:

  • Installing from an infected computer
  • Running Tails on a computer with a compromised BIOS, firmware, or hardware

Because you always have to adapt your digital security practices to your specific needs and threats, we encourage you to learn more by reading the following guides:

Protecting your identity when using Tails

Clean metadata from files before sharing them

Many files contain hidden data, or metadata:

  • JPEG and other image files often contain information about where a picture was taken and which camera was used.

  • Office documents often contain information about their author, and the date and time the document was created.

To help you clean metadata, Tails includes mat2, a tool to remove metadata in a wide range of file formats.

Metadata has been used in the past to locate people from pictures they took. For an example, see NPR: Betrayed by metadata, John McAfee admits he's really in Guatemala.

Use Tails sessions for only one purpose at a time

If you use Tails sessions for more than one purpose at a time, an adversary could link your different activities together.

For example, if you log into different accounts on the same website in a single Tails session, the website could determine that the accounts are used by the same person. This is because websites can tell when 2 accounts are using the same Tor circuit.

To prevent an adversary from linking your activities together while using Tails, restart Tails between different activities. For example, restart Tails between checking your work email and your whistleblowing email.

We are not aware of any such attacks to deanonymize people online who used Tails for different purposes at a time.

If you worry that the files in your Persistent Storage could be used to link your activities together, consider using a different Tails USB stick for each activity. For example, use one Tails USB stick for your activism work and another one for your journalism work.

Limitations of the Tor network

Tails makes it clear that you are using Tor and probably Tails

Everything you do on the Internet from Tails goes through the Tor network.

Tor and Tails don't protect you by making you look like any random Internet user, but by making all Tor and Tails users look the same. It becomes impossible to know who is who among them.

  • Your Internet service provider (ISP) and local network can see that you connect to the Tor network. They still cannot know what sites you visit. To hide that you connect to Tor, you can use a Tor bridge.

  • The sites that you visit can know that you are using Tor, because the list of exit nodes of the Tor network is public.

Parental controls, Internet service providers, and countries with heavy censorship can identify and block connections to the Tor network that don't use Tor bridges.

Many websites ask you to solve a CAPTCHA or block access from the Tor network.

Exit nodes can intercept traffic to the destination server

Tor hides your location from destination servers, but it does not encrypt all your communication. The last relay of a Tor circuit, called the exit node, establishes the actual connection to the destination server. This last step can be unencrypted.

A Tor connection goes through 3 relays with the last one establishing the actual connection to the final destination

The exit node can:

  • Observe your traffic. That is why Tor Browser and Tails include tools, like HTTPS Everywhere, to encrypt the connection between the exit node and the destination server, whenever possible.

  • Pretend to be the destination server, a technique known as machine-in-the-middle attack (MitM). That is why you should pay even more attention to the security warnings in Tor Browser. If you get such a warning, use the New Identity feature of Tor Browser to change exit node.

Warning: Potential Security Risk Ahead

To learn more about what information is available to someone observing the different parts of a Tor circuit, see the interactive graphics at Tor FAQ: Can exit nodes eavesdrop on communications?.

Tor exit nodes have been used in the past to collect sensitive information from unencrypted connections. Malicious exit nodes are regularly identified and removed from the Tor network. For an example, see Ars Technica: Security expert used Tor to collect government e-mail passwords.

Adversaries watching both ends of a Tor circuit could identify users

A powerful adversary, who could analyze the timing and shape of the traffic entering and exiting the Tor network, might be able to deanonymize Tor users. These attacks are called end-to-end correlation attacks, because the attacker has to observe both ends of a Tor circuit at the same time.

No anonymity network used for rapid connections, like browsing the web or instant messaging, can protect 100% from end-to-end correlation attacks. In this case, VPNs (Virtual Private Networks) are less secure than Tor, because they do not use 3 independent relays.

End-to-end correlation attacks have been studied in research papers, but we don't know of any actual use to deanonymize Tor users. For an example, see Murdoch and Zieliński: Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level Adversaries.

Reducing risks when using untrusted computers

Install Tails from a computer that you trust

Tails protects you from viruses and malware on your usual operating system. This is because Tails runs independently from other operating systems.

But your Tails might be corrupted if you install from a compromised operating system. To reduce that risk:

  • Always install Tails from a trusted operating system. For example, download Tails on a computer without viruses or clone Tails from a trusted friend.

  • Do not plug your Tails USB stick while another operating system is running on the computer.

  • Use your Tails USB stick only to run Tails. Do not use your Tails USB stick to transfer files to or from another operating system.

If you worry that your Tails might be corrupted, do a manual upgrade from a trusted operating system.

We don't know of any virus able to infect a Tails installation, but one could be created in the future.

No operating system can protect against hardware alterations

Your computer might be compromised if its physical components have been altered. For example, if a keylogger has been physically installed on your computer, your passwords, personal information, and other data typed on your keyboard could be stored and accessed by someone else, even if you are using Tails.

Try to keep your computer in a safe location. Hardware alterations are more likely on public computers, in internet cafés or libraries, and on desktop computers, where a device is easier to hide.

If you worry that a computer might be modified:

  • Use a password manager to paste saved passwords. This way, you don't have to type passwords that might be visible to people or cameras near you.

  • Use the Screen Keyboard, if you are using a public computer or worry that the computer might have a keylogger.

Keyloggers are easy to buy and hide on desktop computers but not on laptops. For an example, see KeeLog: KeyGrabber forensic keylogger getting started.

Other hardware alterations are much more complicated and expensive to install. For an example, see Ars Technica: Photos of an NSA “upgrade” factory show Cisco router getting implant.

No operating system can protect against BIOS and firmware attacks

Firmware includes the BIOS or UEFI and other software stored in electronic chips on the computer. All operating systems, including Tails, depend on firmware to start and run, so no operating system can protect against a firmware attack. In the same way that a car depends on the quality of the road it is driving on, operating systems depend on their firmware.

Keeping your computer in a safe location can protect against some firmware attacks, but some other firmware attacks can be performed remotely.

Firmware attacks have been demonstrated, but are complicated and expensive to perform. We don't know of any actual use against Tails users. For an example, see LegbaCore: Stealing GPG keys/emails in Tails via remote firmware infection.