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Modified:
2018-11-09
Size: 28.1K
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blueprint/persistent Tor state
Big picture This is about #5462. There are a few good reasons for making Tor's data directory persistent: Faster and less wasteful (in terms of bandwidth) bootstrap. Stronger resistance to certain attacks against anonymity via stable Entry Guard(s). Using stable Entry Guard(s) makes it harder to detect that you're using Tails. Making /var/lib/tor persistent is enough for this. We want to add a persistence preset for it. Goals, non-goals and threat model To start with, we are going to focus...
100% relevant, matching:
guard |
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Modified:
2018-11-09
Size: 12.0K
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blueprint/tails server
Vision Tails Server should provide a user-friendly way to start onion services that facilitate group collaboration, communication, and data sharing. Such services are immensely helpful for working together in groups over distance. Usually they are hosted centrally by a third party. This comes with several perils: Users have to trust that the service provider protects their information and does not use it for other purposes or disclose it, and the provider poses as a single point of attack for adversaries....
90% relevant, matching:
guard |
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Modified:
2018-11-09
Size: 3.6K
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doc/about/fingerprint
In this context, the term fingerprint refers to what is specific to Tails in the way it behaves on Internet. This can be used to determine whether a particular user is using Tails or not. As explained on our warning page, when using Tails it is possible to know that you are using Tor. But Tails tries to make it as difficult as possible to distinguish Tails users from other Tor users, especially users of Tor Browser outside of Tails. If it is possible to determine whether you are a user of Tor Browser inside...
80% relevant, matching:
guard |
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Modified:
2018-11-09
Size: 3.9K
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doc/about/fingerprint.pt
Neste contexto, o termo fingerprint se refere àquilo que é específico do Tails na forma como se comporta na Internet. Isto pode ser usado para determinar se um usuário específico está usando Tails ou não. As explained on our warning page, when using Tails it is possible to know that you are using Tor. But Tails tries to make it as difficult as possible to distinguish Tails users from other Tor users, especially users of Tor Browser outside of Tails. If it is...
79% relevant, matching:
guard |
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Modified:
2018-11-09
Size: 3.0K
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contribute/meetings/201612
Holes on the roof Alant is working on the Greeter, so #5318 is for him. Volunteers to handle important tickets flagged for next release, but without assignee After some looking we got 3 tickets assigned: Upgrade Tor to 0.2.8.10 for intrigeri Have a distribution mechanism for the revocation certificate of our signing key and Remove the FAQ on commercial SSL certificate once boum.org has Let's Encrypt for sajolida Availability for next month: intrigeri: as usual; plans: a Stretch sprint, 1 invoicing...
74% relevant, matching:
guard |
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Modified:
2018-11-09
Size: 4.2K
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doc/about/fingerprint.de
Vorab: Im Folgenden bezieht sich der Begriff »Fingerabdruck« auf spezifische Eigenschaften von Tails. Die können verraten, ob ein bestimmter Anwender/eine bestimmte Anwenderin Tails verwendet oder nicht. Wie auf unserer Warnhinweise-Seite erklärt, ist es bei der Verwendung von Tails möglich, zu erkennen, dass Sie Tor benutzen. Allerdings versucht Tails die Unterscheidung von Tails-Nutzenden zu anderen Tor-Nutzenden so schwierig wie möglich zu machen, insbesondere zu Nutzenden...
71% relevant, matching:
guard |
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Modified:
2019-06-26
Size: 4.0K
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doc/about/fingerprint.it
In questo contesto, il termine fingerprint si riferisce al fatto di come Tails si comporta in Internet. Questo può essere usato per determinare se un particolare utente stia usando Tails oppure no. Come spiegato sulla nostra pagina degli avvisi, quando utilizzi Tails è possibile sapere che stai usando TOR. Ma Tails cerca di rendere più difficile possibile distinguere tra un utente Tails e un'altro utente Tor, in particolare per gli utenti di Tor Browser esterni a Tails. Se è...
71% relevant, matching:
guard |
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Modified:
2019-09-20
Size: 2.5K
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doc/anonymous internet/tor status.es
El icono de estado de Tor y la aplicación Onion Circuits te permiten ver el estado de Tor. Icono de estado de Tor El estado actual de Tor aparece como un icono con forma de cebolla en el área de notificación: Estás conectado/a a Tor. No estás conectado/a a Tor. Cuando no te conectas a Tor, todas las conexiones a Internet se bloquean por defecto. Onion Circuits Onion Circuits muestra información sobre los circuitos actuales y las conexiones de Tor....
60% relevant, matching:
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Modified:
2019-06-10
Size: 2.3K
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doc/anonymous internet/tor status.fa
The Tor status icon and Onion Circuits allow you to view the status of Tor. Tor status icon The current status of Tor appears as an onion-shaped icon in the notification area: You are connected to Tor. You are not connected to Tor. When you are not connected to Tor, all connections to the Internet are blocked by default. Onion Circuits Onion Circuits displays information about the current Tor circuits and connections. To open Onion Circuits, click on the Tor status icon and choose Open...
60% relevant, matching:
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Modified:
2019-06-10
Size: 2.3K
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doc/anonymous internet/tor status.pt
The Tor status icon and Onion Circuits allow you to view the status of Tor. Tor status icon The current status of Tor appears as an onion-shaped icon in the notification area: You are connected to Tor. You are not connected to Tor. When you are not connected to Tor, all connections to the Internet are blocked by default. Onion Circuits Onion Circuits displays information about the current Tor circuits and connections. To open Onion Circuits, click on the Tor status icon and choose Open...
60% relevant, matching:
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