% Tails — Privacy for anyone anywhere % intrigeri % June, 2014 What what who ============= Who I am -------- * Tails contributor * Debian developer What is Tails ------------- **T**he **A**mnesic **I**ncognito **L**ive **S**ystem A Live operating system ----------------------- * works on (almost) any computer * boots off a DD, a USB stick, or a SD card Preserving privacy and anonymity #1 ----------------------------------- * use the Internet anonymously and circumvent censorship: all connections to the Internet are forced to go through the Tor network * leave no trace on the computer you are using unless you ask it explicitly Preserving privacy and anonymity #2 ----------------------------------- * cryptographic tools: encrypt your files, emails and instant messaging * media production tools: sound, video, office publishing, graphics... Other features -------------- * exists since 2009 * translated into many languages * Free Software, public and open development: Git, Redmine, meetings and roadmap * design documentation : And... it works? ---------------- > * According to the NSA, yes : > "(S//REL) Tails: Complete Bootable OS on CD for anonymity - includes Tor > (S//REL) Adds Severe CNE misery to equation" > (Thanks to a famous Tails user for providing these documents.) > * Bruce Schneier, December 2013 : > "What do I trust? I trust, I trust Tails, I trust GPG [...]" > "I don't use Linux. (Shhh. Don't tell anyone.) > Although I have started using Tails"" Usability: a security feature ============================= Our starting point ------------------ * privacy and anonymity: collective matters * more secure tool, but less usable ⇒ collectively, less security Our hypothesis -------------- Often usability matters more than "pure" security. Make a "baseline" security level (privacy, anonymity) very accessible ⇒ Tails is widely used ⇒ more contributors ⇒ energy ↗ to improve security without decreasing usability Examples -------- * GNOME desktop * desktop cryptographic tools (Seahorse, OpenPGP applet, GNOME Disks) * integrates the "Spoof MAC address, or not" decision in a user-friendly way * documentation * translations * warnings * WhisperBack A small delta, to avoid drowning ================================ ## History lesson Often, specialized distributions die quickly. At least in this area. ✝ Haven, Anonym.OS, ParanoidLinux, onionOS, Phantomix and many others. RIP. ## Why? * small teams, not organized to grow * underestimation of the maintenance and user support work * no long-term commitment * NIH ## Our hypothesis * focus on maintainability * avoid having a delta that grows too much, or too fast, wrt. our upstreams ## Examples: what we did not do internally ... despite pressure: * grsecurity * compile-time hardening ## Examples: what we did internally ... but should share: * OpenPGP applet * erasing memory on shutdown ## Examples: what we're doing upstream * AppArmor * libvirt * Seahorse * Debian * Debian Live * fix OTR downgrade → v1 Consequences #1 --------------- * little Tails-specific code * glue work * "social" work: talk to upstreams spread the word about our needs find skilled people to do the work at the best place * slow rhythm (waiting the next Debian release, and sometimes the one after), despite backports Consequences #2 --------------- And, above all... . . . *Tails is still alive!* Challenges ========== Cadence & popularity -------------------- - new release every 6 weeks - about 10k boots a day, doubles every 6-9 months Limited resources and time -------------------------- - mostly volunteer work - 2000 commits, by ~10 persons, on the last 6 months Roadmap ======= Overview -------- > * welcome more varied contributions > * ... from more varied people > * make our life easier > * make Tails (even) more usable > * better protect users against targeted attacks This summer ----------- > - **Tails 1.1** — July 22: Debian Wheezy, UEFI And then -------- - **Tails 2.0**: sustainability and maintainability Greeter same-day security updates mitigate effects of security holes - **Tails 3.0**: hardening, sandboxing - More? Tails needs you, for... ======================= ## Translation Translators can allow more people around the world to use Tails. ## Documentation Good writers can make Tails accessible to more people. * #6318: Fix key trusting instructions to work when we update our signing key * #6469: Document the workflow to upgrade Tails from ISO using 2 USB sticks ## Tests Early testers help improve Tails quality. * #5174: Test Pidgin SSL validation in Debian unstable * #5709: Test OnionCat unidirectional mode for VoIP ## Design Web and graphics designers can make Tails easier to use and more appealing. * #7258: Make the logos on the homepage clickable * #6323: Improve the CSS of the boxed titles * #6361: Create a stylesheet for the contributor's role ## Usability User interface and user experience experts can make Tails easier to use and more appealing. * #7437: Design a progress indicator while establishing a connection to Tor * #6417: Evaluate Tails Greeter revamp proposals ## Code Software people with very diverse skills can improve Tails. * #5917: tails-greeter password field : Warn when caps-lock in ON * #6918: Track hardening status of the binaries shipped in Tails * #5881: Add reboot button to persistence setup assistant ## Infrastructure System administrators can improve the development and quality assurance processes. * #6295: Evaluate consequences of importing large amounts of packages into reprepro * #6891: Monitor broken links on our website ## Debian One can improve Tails (and other Debian derivatives, such as Freepto ;) by contributing to Debian. * AppArmor () * #6507: Package our OpenPGP applet for Debian * #7352: Backport ruby-libvirt 0.5+ for Wheezy ## Money Those who have too much money can speed up the development of Tails. ## Where to start? * * "easy" tasks ## Tell us about your skills and desires, we'll help you get started :) Contact ======= ## Talk to us * I'm here. * Development mailing-list: **** * Mailing-list for translators: **** * Early testers mailing-list: **** * Private and encrypted mailing-list: **** * IRC: see * Web: ****