One serious security issue is that we don't know what software will attempt to contact the network and whether their proxy settings are set up to use the Tor SOCKS proxy or polipo HTTP(s) proxy correctly. This is solved by blocking all outbound Internet traffic except Tor and I2P, and explicitly configure all applications to use either of these.
- config/chroot local-includes/etc/ferm/ferm.conf
(uses ferm to build an
iptablesruleset)
The default case is to block all outbound network traffic; let us now document all exceptions and some clarifications to this rule.
Tor user
Tor itself obviously has to connect to the Internet without going
through the Tor network. This is achieved by special-casing
connections originating from the debian-tor Unix user.
I2P
I2P (Invisible Internet Project) is yet another anonymizing network (load-balanced unspoofable packet switching network) that provides access to eepsites (.i2p tld); eepsites are a bit like Tor hidden services. Some users would like to be able to access eepsites from Tails.
Like the debian-tor user, the i2p user is allowed to connect
directly to the Internet. See the design document dedicated to
Tails use of I2P for details.
Unsafe Browser and the clearnet user
The clearnet user used to run the
Unsafe Browser is granted full network access
(but no loopback access) in order to deal with captive portals.
Local Area Network (LAN)
Tails short description talks of sending through Tor outgoing connections to the Internet. Indeed: traffic to the local LAN (RFC1918 addresses) is wide open as well as the loopback traffic obviously.
LAN DNS queries are forbidden to protect against some attacks.
Local services whitelist
The Tails firewall uses a whitelist which only grants access to each local service to the users that actually need it. This blocks potential leaks due to misconfigurations or bugs, and deanonymization attacks by compromised processes. For specifics, see the firewall configuration where this is well commented: config/chroot local-includes/etc/ferm/ferm.conf
Automapped addresses
AutomapHostsOnResolve is enabled in Tor configuration, and
a firewall rule transparently redirects to the Tor transparent proxy
port the connections targeted at the 127.192.0.0/10 virtual mapped
address space.
Only the amnesia user is granted access to the Tor transparent proxy
port, so in practice only them can use this hostname-to-address
mapping facility.
IPv6
Tor does not support IPv6 yet so IPv6 communication is blocked.
UDP, ICMP and other non-TCP protocols
Tor only supports TCP. Non-TCP traffic to the Internet, such as UDP datagrams and ICMP packets, is dropped unless it's going through I2P, which supports UDP.
